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PLEASE STOP: THE LAW COURT'S
RECENT ROADBLOCK DECISIONS
I. INTRODUCTION
Police checkpoints or "roadblocks"' have become an increasingly
utilized law enforcement tool. At best, these checkpoints result in
only a minor inconvenience to motorists. When abused, however,
roadblocks have the potential for invidious invasions of privacy and
personal freedom.
2
Roadblocks are designed to deter, and to a lesser extent detect,
criminal activity by stopping everyone-both the guilty and the law-
abiding-for a brief inspection, thereby impinging to some degree on
one's freedom of travel, privacy, and "right to be let alone. ' 3 Such
''seizures" must be "reasonable" under the Fourth Amendment in
order to survive constitutional challenge.'
The major difference between roadblocks and other law enforce-
1. In this Comment, the terms "roadblock" and "police checkpoint" are used in-
terchangeably. Both terms refer to the police technique of forcing all moving vehicles
(or a predetermined fraction, such as every third vehicle) to a stop to determine
whether the motorist has violated any laws or regulations. Where logical in context,
these terms also refer to "riverblocks," which are similar stops of canoes paddling
down a river.
2. For example, in Hatfield t'. Comm'r of Inland Fisheries and Wildlife. 566 A.2d
737, 739 (Me. 1989) (the "riverblock case"), one of the plaintiffs, who had been en-
joying a leisurely canoe trip down one of the state's rivers, was subjected to an "intru-
sive" search of his body and effects which included the "pulling open of his waistband
for inspection inside his shorts." While the canoeists were detained for periods of up
to twenty minutes, police dogs were sometimes allowed to roam freely among the
canoes "sniffing the canoes and canoeists" being detained. Id. at 738.
3. See Higbie v. State, 780 S.W.2d 228, 232-33 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989) ("All three
of these rights are materially intruded upon by the State when it insists on stopping
motorists at a roadblock without some legitimate basis predicated on probable cause
or reasonable suspicion."). See also Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, - U.S.
, 110 S.Ct 2481, 2490 (1990) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("In the face of the 'mo-
mentary evil' of drunken driving, the Court. . . abdicates its role as the protector of
[a] fundamental right.").
4. See, e.g., Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 110 S.Ct. at 2485 ("a Fourth
Amendment 'seizure' occurs when a vehicle is stopped at a checkpoint"). The Fourth
Amendment guarantees that "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons.
houses, papers and effects, from unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be vio-
lated .... " U.S. CoNsT., amend. IV. Likewise, Article 1, § 5 of the Maine Constitu-
tion provides that:
The people shall be secure in their persons, houses, papers and possessions
from all unreasonable searches; and no warrant to search any place, or seize
any person or thing, shall issue without a special designation of the place to
be searched, and person or thing to be seized, nor without probable
cause-supported by oath or affirmation.
ME. CoNsT. Art. I, § 5. In endorsing the constitutionality of roadblocks, however, the
Law Court has either not had the opportunity or has declined to examine the Maine
Constitution for independentt and adequate state grounds to strike down roadblocks.
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ment seizures is that at roadblocks the traditional justifications for
seizures are absent; motorists are stopped without regard to suspi-
cion of criminal conduct. Individual rights are thus sacrificed to pro-
mote what many courts have considered to be greater public inter-
ests, such as the apprehension of drunken drivers.
In Maine, however, roadblocks have been approved for use in
combating societal problems which are much less urgent. For exam-
ple, the Supreme Judicial Court, sitting as the Law Court, has found
roadblocks to be a constitutionally permissible means of law en-
forcement not only for the purpose of apprehending drunken driv-
ers,5 but also for such other objectives as enforcing fish and game
regulations,6 inspecting vehicle safety equipment,7 and checking for
valid driver's licenses and registrations:'
The Law Court's willingness to permit roadblocks to effectuate
such ordinary and routine state interests as checking to make sure
that a driver is carrying a valid driver's license or that his headlights
work should raise serious doubts as to the continuing vitality of
Fourth Amendment protections in Maine. Moreover, the dearth of
forthright analysis found in the court's decisions on the subject
raises the question of whether the Law Court has abdicated its re-
sponsibility as the protector of such important constitutional rights
as freedom from unreasonable search and seizure.'
Ultimately, Fourth Amendment analysis involves a balance be-
tween the societal interest in apprehending criminals versus the so-
cietal interest in privacy and personal liberty.' ° This Comment as-
serts that, in its roadblock decisions, the Law Court has focused
almost exclusively on the "law and order" side of the equation while
virtually ignoring the countervailing interest in individual liberties.
5. See State v. Babcock, 559 A.2d 337 (Me. 1989); State v. McMahon, 557 A.2d
1324 (Me. 1989) (roadblock to check safety equipment as well as operating under the
influence [hereinafter OUI]); State v. Leighton, 551 A.2d 116 (Me. 1988).
6. See State v. Sherburne, 571 A.2d 1181 (Me. 1990).
7. See State v. Patterson, 582 A.2d 1204 (Me. 1990); State v. McMahon, 557 A.2d
1324 (Me. 1989).
8. See State v. Cloukey, 486 A.2d 143 (Me. 1985) (license, registration, and safety
equipment check).
In addition, in a case before the Law Court involving "riverblocks" conducted for
the purpose of quieting unruly canoeists, the court disapproved of the manner in
which the particular operation at bar was carried out but did not reject the technique
itself as unconstitutional. See Hatfield v. Comm'r of Inland Fisheries and Wildlife,
566 A.2d 737 (Me. 1989).
9. It also prompts the Author to wonder whether the police have resorted to a
dragnet approach to law enforcement as a shortcut for establishing probable cause.
For example, a roadblock "net" which has ostensibly been cast for the purpose of
making sure that those entering the roadblock have not exceeded the legal fish limit,
see, e.g. State v. Sherburne, 571 A.2d 1181, could actually have been cast to yield a
far greater trove of wrongdoers.
10. See infra text accompanying note 14.
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In addition, by evaluating several recent Law Court cases in light of
the relevant United States Supreme Court decisions, this Comment
demonstrates that the Law Court has failed to forthrightly apply
Supreme Court precedent.
II. BACKGROUND
The Supreme Court first considered the issue of roadblocks
designed to combat drunken driving in Michigan Department of
State Police v. Sitz." In evaluating the constitutionality of the road-
block, the Court employed a balancing test derived from two previ-
ous roadblock cases, United States v. Martinez-Fuerte'2 and Brown
v. Texas. 3 The test, as enunciated in Brown, calls for a "weighing of
the gravity of the public concerns served by the seizure, the degree
to which the seizure advances the public interest, and the severity of
the interference with individual liberty."" The Sitz majority quickly
disposed of the first two prongs of the Brown test, finding drunken
driving to be an exceedingly grave problem,'" and the Michigan
roadblocks sufficiently effective in countering the problem." On the
other side of the scale, the Court concluded that the intrusion on
motorists was "slight" and indeed virtually identical to that caused
by fixed border checkpoints, which the Court had previously upheld
in Martinez-Fuerte.1
7
11. 110 S.Ct. 2481 (1990).
12. 428 U.S. 543 (1976) (holding fixed border checkpoints constitutional).
13. 443 U.S. 47 (1979) (approving roadblocks to check for unlicensed drivers).
Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 110 S. CL at 2485.
14. Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. at 50-51. The Brown test has three distinct parts,
each of which is taken into consideration when assessing the reasonableness of a par-
ticular search or seizure. As noted by the Law Court, the Brown test differs from the
test employed in Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654 (1979), only in that it bifur-
cates the analysis of the "promotion of legitimate governmental interests." See State
v. Patterson, 582 A.2d at 1205.
15. Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 110 S.CL at 2485-86.
16. Id. at 2486-87. The Court relied partly on the evidence from the Michigan
roadblock at issue, where the stopping of 126 vehicles resulted in the arrest of two
drunken drivers. However, the Court made clear that the Brown test "was not meant
to transfer from politically accountable officials to the courts the decision as to which
among reasonable alternative law enforcement techniques should be employed to deal
with a serious public danger." Id. at 2488. As long as there is some empirical support
(such as actual drunk-driving arrests as a result of the roadblock), the second prong
of the Brown test will likely be satisfied. See id. at 2487-88.
17. Id. 2486. As Justice Stevens pointed out in his dissenting opinion in Sitz, how-
ever, there are critical differences between the two types of roadblocks-dilferences
which can make border checkpoints comparatively less intrusive. At a permanent bor-
der checkpoint, a motorist has fair notice of the roadblock and can easily avoid an
unwanted encounter with authorities if the motorist so chooses. Temporary road-
blocks, however, generally operate by surprise, thus potentially trapping an unwilling
motorist in an inescapable encounter with police. Justice Stevens explained: "A driver
who discovers an unexpected checkpoint on a familiar local road will be startled and
distressed. She may infer, correctly. . . that the police have made a discretionary
1992]
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The Sitz case was an important milestone in a long line of cases
that carved out various exceptions to the Fourth Amendment for
certain suspicionless seizures. Prior to Sitz, the Court had approved
of suspicionless searches for regulatory (non-penal) purposes,18 to
apprehend illegal aliens near the border," to check the documents
of ocean vessels headed for open sea (in order to combat drug traf-
ficking),20 and to check for valid driver's licenses and vehicle regis-
trations.2' Because the Sitz case specifically addressed police check-
points and has effectively consolidated the law in this area, this
Comment will treat the Sitz decision as a guidepost when analyzing
the Maine Law Court's roadblock decisions.
22
Before the landmark Sitz roadblock decision, Delaware v.
Prouse2 3 provided some authority to support the constitutionality of
certain kinds of roadblocks. In Prouse, the Supreme Court held that
a random stop of a vehicle to check for a valid driver's license and
registration is unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment in the
absence of at least articulable and reasonable suspicion that the mo-
torist is unlicensed or unregistered. In reaching this conclusion, the
Court balanced the "intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amend-
decision to focus their law enforcement efforts upon her and others who pass the
chosen point." Id. at 2492 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Justice Stevens pointed to other important differences between the two types of
roadblocks. A permanent border checkpoint leaves no room for discretion by local
officers concerning either the timing or location of the stop, and the procedures for
questioning the motorists can be standardized far more easily. Furthermore, drunken
driving roadblocks tend to be employed at night, something that Justice Stevens
found potentially far more intimidating than daytime stops, which are usually the
case at border checkpoints. Id. at 2492-93 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
18. See Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967); See v. City of Seattle,
387 U.S. 541 (1967).
19. See United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976).
20. See United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, 462 U.S. 579 (1983).
21. See Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730 (1983). See also Delaware v. Prouse, 440
U.S. 648 (1979), where the Court rejected random stops of vehicles without any indi-
vidualized suspicion, but suggested in dictum that the "[q]uestioning of all oncoming
traffic at roadblock-type stops is one possible alternative" to unconstitutional random
stops. Id. at 663.
In addition to these areas, the Court upheld suspicionless immigration "sweeps" at
the workplace in INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210 (1984), and the Court recently permit-
ted suspicionless blood or urine testing of railroad and customs personnel in Skinner
v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989) and National Treasury Em-
ployees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989).
22. Only one of the Maine roadblock cases, State v. Patterson, 582 A.2d 1204 (Me.
1990). was decided after Sitz. Therefore, for the sake of accuracy, it is necessary to
analyze the Law Court's pre-Sitz decisions in light of the Supreme Court's precedents
existing at the time these cases were decided. It is not unfair, however, to compare
also these cases that came before it; the case to Sitz was arguably nothing more than
a logical extension of the cases that came before it; the case did not add any signifi-
cant new factors to the Supreme Court's analysis.
23. 440 U.S. 648 (1979).
[Vol. 44:461
RECENT ROADBLOCK DECISIONS
ment interests against [the] promotion of legitimate governmental
interests" which gave rise to the law enforcement technique at is-
sue." Nevertheless, the Court engaged in dictum that became the
justification in many states for upholding roadblocks in the years
prior to Sitz: "This holding does not preclude the State of Delaware
or other States from developing methods for spot checks that in-
volve less intrusion or that do not involve the unconstrained exercise
of discretion. Questioning of all oncoming traffic at roadblock-type
stops is one possible alternative.
'25
The Law Court first approved the use of police roadblocks in
Maine some five years before the Sitz decision,2' and has re-affirmed
this position six times since 1985." A close examination of these
Maine roadblock cases reveals that, increasingly, the Law Court has
upheld roadblocks in cases where the facts do not comport with the
protective standards adopted by the Supreme Court in this area.
III. THE PRE-SrTZ CASES
A. State v. Cloukey
The Law Court first approved the use of roadblocks in 1985 in
State v. Cloukey.28 This case involved a roadblock conducted for the
purpose of checking vehicle safety equipment as well as the driver's
license, registration, and inspection sticker. The stops were con-
ducted by a state trooper and a deputy sheriff who had informed the
24. Id. at 654. This equation was derived from Camara v. Municipal Court, 387
U.S. 523 (1967), a case that required "area" warrants for suspicionless administrative
searches of dwellings for the purpose of preventing conditions that are hazardous to
public health and safety. In addressing the reasonableness of "area inspections" (in-
spection of a large number of structures within a certain region or neighborhood of
the municipality), the Camara Court utilized three factors in balancing the need for
the search against the intrusion caused by the search:
1. the history of judicial and public acceptance of the practice;
2. whether any other technique would achieve "acceptable results;" and,
3. the extent of the invasion of the citizen's privacy.
Id. at 537. See also 4 WAYNE R LAFAVE. SEARCHES AND SEIZURES § 10.8(a) (2d ed. 1987
& Supp. 1992).
25. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. at 663 (footnote omitted). This statement by the
Court is mere dictum, however, because the facts of Prouse involved a random suspi-
cionless stop of a single motorist, rather than a roadblock. In addition, by labeling the
roadblock idea as a "possible alternative," the Prouse Court was clearly withholding
final judgment on roadblocks until confronted with a case involving an actual
roadblock.
26. See State v. Cloukey, 486 A.2d 143 (Me. 1985).
27. State v. Leighton, 551 A.2d 116 (Me. 1988) (OUI roadblock); State v. McMa-
hon, 557 A.2d 1324 (Me. 1989) (OUI roadblock); State v. Babcock. 559 A.2d 337 (Me.
1989) (OUI roadblock); Hatfield v. Comm'r of Inland Fisheries and Wildlife, 566 A.2d
737 (Me. 1989) (riverblock held unconstitutional on other grounds); State v.
Sherburne, 571 A.2d 1181 (Me. 1990) (roadblock to enforce fish and game regula-
tions); State v. Patterson, 582 A.2d 1204 (Me. 1990) (vehicle safety roadblock).
28. 486 A.2d 143 (Me. 1985).
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sheriff of the location of the proposed roadblock and received the
sheriff's permission to conduct it. The deputy testified that the loca-
tion of the roadblock had a high accident rate.29
In finding the Cloukey roadblock constitutional, the Law Court
claimed to be applying the balancing test derived from Prouse, i.e.,
whether the state's interest, under the particular circumstances, out-
weighs the intrusion inflicted on motorists passing through the
roadblock.30
1. State's Interest
The Cloukey decision raised several analytical problems. First, the
court did not attempt to spell out the extent of the state's interest
in apprehending unlicensed or unregistered drivers. This examina-
tion is of prime importance because, under the balancing approach,
it is the degree of state interest that can justify breaches of Fourth
Amendment protections, not just the existence of some State objec-
tive.3 1 Instead, the court simply stated as fact that Maine has a "vi-
tal interest" in protecting its citizens from persons unqualified to
drive.
32
After reaching this conclusion, the court briefly discussed the
availability of less intrusive means to achieve the state's objective.
The court pointed out that this case did not involve a sobriety stop,
where "[t]here may be many effective ways of detecting a drunk
driver without intruding on the rights of the citizen. '33 The court
reasoned that "[a] trained eye can readily spot erratic operation,"
but that "[t]he unlicensed driver, however, displays no observable
characteristics." '34 This conclusion is not necessarily warranted.
First, as the Supreme Court observed in Prouse, "[v]ehicle stops
for traffic violations occur countless times each day; and on these
occasions, licenses and registration papers are subject to inspection
and drivers without them will be ascertained. Furthermore, drivers
without licenses are presumably the less safe drivers whose propen-
29. Id. at 143-44.
30. Id. at 145, 147.
31. Id. at 146.
32. Id. This conclusion is unimpeachable. However, without any discussion of the
seriousness or magnitude of the unlicensed driver problem in Maine, it is impossible
to balance effectively the state's interest against the intrusion into individual
liberties.
33. 1d. at 146-47. The court's negative analogy to sobriety stops in the context of
examining the state's interest is puzzling. One would think that the state's interest in
preventing drunken driving would be at least equal to or greater than its interest in
checking for valid licenses and registrations. Drunken drivers are probably a great
degree more lethal than are unlicensed or unregistered motorists. Therefore, it seems
that the state's interest in stopping drunken drivers before they exhibit erratic behav-
ior would be correspondingly greater than its interest in checking for valid licenses
and registrations. See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. at 666 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
34. State v. Cloukey, 486 A.2d at 147.
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sities may well exhibit themselves." 35 In addition, all Maine vehicles
are required to carry license plates with registration stickers which
indicate whether the car's registration is current.38 The stickers are
color-coded and readable without the necessity of bringing the vehi-
cle to a complete stop. Second, the Cloukey stops involved the
checking of vehicle safety equipment such as tires, lights, and direc-
tional signals 37-defects which are usually observable while the vehi-
cle is in motion.
2. Degree of Intrusion into Fourth Amendment Rights
On the other side of the scale, the court made a feeble attempt to
quantify the degree of intrusion caused by the roadblock. Instead of
analyzing the intrusion caused by the particular roadblock at issue
in the case, the court resorted to comparing a roadblock to a stop by
a roving patrol officer. Based on "[clommon experience alone," the
court found that a roving stop is "far more intrusive, alarming, and
unsettling" than being stopped as part of a line of traffic."
This conclusion is similarly debatable as support for the road-
block in Cloukey. The typical driver will witness roving patrol stops
almost daily, as such stops are commonplace. Being stopped by a
roving patrol officer requires at least some suspicion that the driver
has broken a law.3 9 It is therefore likely that a driver who has been
"pulled over" by a police officer will not be wholly surprised since
she has theoretically done something wrong to merit such a fate. By
contrast, being detained without having violated a law could be star-
tling as well as annoying. Such stops may even evoke the terror of
totalitarianism to those drivers that have experienced life in a police
state.4 o
It is also puzzling that while a single roving stop without any sus-
picion of wrongdoing was a violation of the Fourth Amendment
under Prouse, the Law Court could find that hundreds (or poten-
tially thousands) of equally suspicionless stops presented no consti-
tutional problem.," In reaching this conclusion, the court relied on
35. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. at 659.
36. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 29, §§ 110, 381 (West 1978 & Supp. 1991-1992).
37. State v. Cloukey, 486 A.2d at 144.
38. Id. at 147.
39. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. at 661. See also United States v. Brignoni-Ponce,
422 U.S. 873 (1975) (apparent Mexican ancestry of drivers near border is insufficient
ground for a roving stop); Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266 (1973)
(suspicionless search by border patrol 25 miles from border violated Fourth
Amendment).
40. "In my opinion, unannounced investigatory seizures are. particularly when
they take place at night, the hallmark of regimes different from ours; the surprise
intrusion upon individual liberty is not minimal." Michigan Dep't of State Police v.
Sitz, 110 S.Ct. at 2495 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
41. The state's interest in each case was roughly equal. The patrolman in Prouse
1992]
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the dictum from Prouse which arguably supports suspicionless
roadblocks."2
The degree of discretion left to the individual officers in Cloukey
presented another constitutional problem. Since the idea for the
roadblock, its conduct, and its procedure, came from field officers
rather than supervisory officials, this case raised the possibility of
the kind of unlimited officer discretion that the Supreme Court had
denounced in Prouse and Martinez-Fuerte. Although the deputy
and trooper apparently did not exercise any discretion in deciding
which vehicles to stop-they stopped all vehicles-they were not
constrained by any official guidelines or policies as to the location of
the roadblock and the procedure to be followed during the stops.
The Supreme Court had already expressed its concern that if too
much control of the roadblocks rested in the hands of field officers,
such checkpoints could be used to target certain groups for harass-
ment, or, alternatively, the checkpoints could, at a minimum, imper-
missibly invade individual privacy interests. 4 3 The Prouse court
stated: "In those situations in which the balance of interests pre-
cludes insistence upon 'some quantum of individualized suspicion,'
other safeguards are generally relied upon to assure that the indi-
vidual's reasonable expectation of privacy is not 'subject to the dis-
cretion of the official in the field. . . .' '" Notwithstanding this ad-
monition, the Law Court, without elaboration, concluded that the
lack of meaningful participation by supervisory personnel in the
planning or conduct of the roadblock was not controlling.4 0 The
court did not rely at all on Martinez-Fuerte, the only Supreme
Court case prior to Cloukey which had directly addressed the ques-
tion of roadblocks. Martinez-Fuerte, which upheld permanent bor-
testified that the stop was made to check the driver's license and registration, Dela-
ware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. at 650, while the purpose of the Cloukey roadblock was to
conduct a "traffic safety check." State v. Cloukey, 486 A.2d at 144.
42. See supra note 25 and accompanying text. Some other state courts, in addi-
tion to the Law Court, have relied on the Prouse language as an unequivocal Supreme
Court endorsement of roadblocks. "The fallacy of this argument is that the dictum
has only been elevated to precedential proportions in a limited number of cases, and
in no circumstance has the Supreme Court [prior to Sitz] ever used the words or
condoned the creation of 'traffic safety roadblocks.'" Higbie v. State, 780 S.W.2d 228,
231 n.4 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989) (holding an OUI checkpoint unconstitutional).
43. See, e.g., Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. at 653-54 ("The essential purpose of
the proscriptions in the Fourth Amendment is to impose a standard of 'reasonable-
ness' upon the exercise of discretion by government officials, including law enforce-
ment agents, in order '"to safeguard the privacy and security of individuals against
arbitrary invasions .... "' " (footnote omitted)).
44. Id. at 654-55 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted) (quoting Camara v. Munici-
pal Court, 387 U.S. at 532). The Court did not specify what the "other safeguards"
were, but cited Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. at 534-35, Marshall v. Barlow's
Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 320-21 (1978), and United States v. United States District Court,
407 U.S. 297, 322-23 (1972), each of which required warrants to be issued.
45. State v. Cloukey, 486 A.2d at 146.
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der checkpoints, reasoned that such checkpoints were constitution-
ally permissible in part because their use and conduct were not left
to the discretion of individual field officers, thus minimizing the
dangers of abusive and harassing conduct by police.
At the same time, the Cloukey court also recited, but did not ex-
plicitly apply, a set of 13 factors which it described as "representa-
tive"46 and which were derived from a Kansas case, State v. Des-
kins.47 The first of the Deskins factors is "[t]he degree of discretion,
if any, left to the officer in the field.""8 The Law Court's failure to
address the discretion issue in Cloukey and later cases reflects the
court's relaxed approach to analyzing the degree of intrusion into
Fourth Amendment rights in the roadblock context.
Overall, the Cloukey court concluded that the degree of intrusion
into the defendant's Fourth Amendment interests had been "mini-
mal," and thus was outweighed by the state's "vital interest" in
identifying unlicensed or unregistered drivers and vehicles with de-
fective or inadequate safety equipment."9 Though analytically weak,
Cloukey became the foundation for the Law Court's consideration of
roadblock cases until the Supreme Court decided Sitz in 1990.
Cloukey made it clear that Maine drivers could be constitutionally
stopped at a roadblock without the police having any suspicion
whatsoever that a violation of law had occurred, so long as some
state interest was advanced by the stops. Furthermore, the Law
Court intimated that such factors as the amount of officer discretion
involved and the availability of less intrusive alternatives would not
be seriously considered.
46. Id.
47. 673 P.2d 1174, 1185 (Kan. 1983).
48. Id. The other "Deskins factors" are:
(2) the location designated for the roadblock;
(3) the time and duration of the roadblock;
(4) standards set by superior officers;
(5) advance notice to the public at large;
(6) advance warning to the individual approaching motorist;
(7) maintenance of safety conditions;
(8) degree of fear or anxiety generated by the mode of operation;
(9) average length of time each motorist is detained;
(10) physical factors surrounding the location, type, and method of
operation;
(11) the availability of less intrusive methods for combating the problem;
(12) the degree of effectiveness of the procedure; and
(13) any other relevant circumstance which might bear upon the test.
Id. Although the Cloukey court considered these factors "representative." and the
same factors have often been referred to by the court in later roadblock cases, neither
in Cloukey nor in the later cases did the court actually apply any of the particular
Deskins factors.
49. State v. Cloukey, 486 A.2d at 146-47.
1992]
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B. The OUI Cases
After deciding Cloukey, the Law Court had almost no difficulty
sustaining the use of roadblocks conducted for the purpose of appre-
hending drunken drivers. In State v. Leighton,"0 the court affirmed
the district court's denial of the defendant's motions to suppress ev-
idence and to dismiss the OUI charge stemming from his arrest at a
"sobriety" roadblock in Hancock County.51 State v. McMahon"2 and
State v. Babcock53 were decided the following year on similar facts
and the court came to identical conclusions.
1. State's Interest
In applying the balancing test adopted by the court in Cloukey,
the Leighton court recognized that the state obviously has a strong
interest in keeping drunken drivers off the road."" Yet in weighing
this important State interest against the intrusion upon the defend-
ant's Fourth Amendment rights, the court did not discuss whether
the roadblock was in fact an effective means of advancing the state's
interest.55 Although the court rested much of its conclusion on the
dictum in Prouse, that case held that the challenged law enforce-
ment technique must be compared to alternative methods to deter-
mine whether the challenged technique is a "sufficiently productive
mechanism" to warrant the incursion into Fourth Amendment inter-
ests.56 Interestingly, there are data available from other states sug-
gesting that roadblocks are an inefficient use of police resources as
compared with the ever higher degree of effectiveness of traditional
methods." In Maryland, for example, over the course of several
years, 41,000 motorists passed through 125 roadblocks. Of these mo-
50. 551 A.2d 116 (Me. 1988).
51. Id. at 116.
52. 557 A.2d 1324 (Me. 1989).
53. 559 A.2d 337 (Me. 1989).
54. State v. Leighton, 551 A.2d at 118.
55. This is curious given the court's dicta in Cloukey, decided just four years ear-
lier than Leighton, that "[tlhere may be many effective ways of detecting a drunken
driver without intruding on the rights of the citizen. A trained eye can readily spot
erratic operation." State v. Cloukey, 486 A.2d at 147.
56. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. at 659. In addition, the Leighton court again
recited the Deskins factors, see supra note 48 and accompanying text, suggesting that
an inquiry into the effectiveness of the roadblock is relevant. However, the eleventh
Deskins factor, "the availability of less intrusive methods for combating the prob-
lem," and the twelfth factor, "the degree of effectiveness of the procedure," were evi-
dently ignored by the court. See State v. Leighton, 551 A.2d at 118 (quoting State v.
Cloukey, 486 A.2d at 146 (quoting State v. Deskins, 673 P.2d 1174, 1185 (Kan.
1983))). See also State v. Koppel, 499 A.2d 977 (N.H. 1985) (holding that the state
failed to demonstrate that less intrusive alternatives did not exist).




torists, only 143 persons (0.3%) were arrested. 8
2. Degree of Intrusion
Disturbingly, in none of the OUI cases did the Law Court assess
the extent of the intrusion into the Fourth Amendment interest in
freedom from unreasonable seizure. Nowhere in Leighton, McMa-
hon, or Babcock did the court discuss the possible in terrorem effect
of being stopped with no notice in the middle of the night without
having broken any law, or of the invasion of privacy caused by of-
ficers asking questions while peering with flashlights into car win-
dows. Instead, the court simply categorized such intrusions as
"minimal." 59
As for the amount of discretion exercised by individual officers,
the facts of Leighton and McMahon suggest that far less discretion
was being left to the individual officer than was present in
Cloukey.s° Nevertheless, neither the Leighton nor McMahon check-
points were operated in accordance with written policies regarding
the conduct of the roadblock.6 1 Having such written policies is one
important safeguard against abuse and harassment by authorities.
0 2
58. Id. at 2491 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens also pointed out that the
relationship between roadblocks and an actual reduction in highway fatalities is even
less substantial than the impact on arrest rates. Justice Stevens discussed a Maryland
study which revealed that alcohol related accidents in a county which used road-
blocks decreased by ten percent, whereas the accident rate in a county which did not
use roadblocks decreased by eleven percent. Fatal accidents in the non-roadblock
county decreased from sixteen to three, while fatal accidents in the checkpoint county
actually doubled. Id. at 2491-92 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
59. State v. Leighton, 551 A.2d at 118; State v. McMahon, 557 A.2d at 1325. In
both cases the court never specifically addressed the eighth Deshins factor. -the de-
gree of fear and anxiety generated by the mode of operation." See supra note 48.
60. In Leighton, for example, the roadblock was personally directed by the Sheriff
and the patrol supervisor. State v. Leighton, 551 A.2d at 116-17. The roadblocks were
set up at a time and place where drunken drivers were likely to be encountered. No
discretion was used to determine which vehicles would be stopped. Also, several mea-
sures were taken to provide for the safe operation of the roadblock. Id. at 118.
61. Id. at 119. See also State v. McMahon, 557 A.2d at 1325.
62. See State v. Jones, 483 So. 2d 433 (Fla. 1986). In -Jones the Florida Supreme
Court stated:
Because [OUI] roadblocks involve seizures made without any articulable
suspicion of illegal activity, most states examining this issue have ruled that
such roadblocks stand or fall based on some set of neutral criteria gov-
erning the officers in the field. . . .Courts requiring such a neutral plan do
so out of fear that unbridled discretion in the field invites abuse. (There-
forej it is essential that a written set of uniform guidelines be issued before
a roadblock can be utilized.
Id. at 438 (citations omitted). See also State v. Superior Court In & For County of





In apparently the first case of its kind in the United States, the
Law Court in 1989 considered (and tacitly approved) the constitu-
tionality of "riverblocks" in Hatfield v. Commissioner of Inland
Fisheries and Wildlife."3 Here the court avoided a clear opportunity
to draw a line beyond which incursions into the Fourth Amendment
would not be permitted. The case, a class action, 4 stemmed from
checkpoints set up by various state officials on the Saco River dur-
ing the summer of 1988. The goal of the riverblocks was to deter a
rising tide of rowdiness and hooliganism on the part of some canoe-
ists using the river.6 5 All canoeists entering the checkpoint were de-
tained to determine whether they had violated safety regulations or
had broken drug or liquor laws. The period of detention varied from
several minutes to more than fifteen minutes depending on the vol-
ume of canoe traffic.66
Unfortunately, the wardens and state troopers conducting the
riverblocks engaged in some Gestapo-like tactics. Two police dogs
were used and were sometimes allowed to freely roam around the
detained canoes while sniffing both the canoes and canoeists. 7 The
canoeists were asked whether they were carrying any contraband.
Some officers informed canoeists that if they voluntarily surren-
dered any contraband they would not be prosecuted, but would be
arrested immediately if illegal narcotics were subsequently discov-
ered in their possession. 8 One plaintiff testified that he was told to
display his personal flotation device and to surrender any drugs or
narcotics. He was next asked to stand up and empty his pockets
after which he was subjected to a pat-down of his body. The officer
then pulled open the plaintiff's waistband and inspected inside his
shorts.6 The officers conducting the riverblock were unconstrained
by any oral or written procedures governing such a checkpoint, and
the canoeists were not given advance notice or warning of the check-
point until they were only a few yards away. Due to the flow of the
river, it would have been impossible for canoeists to avoid the river-
block unless they abandoned their trip upstream of the
checkpoint.
70
On these undisputed facts, the State was forced to admit that
63. 566 A.2d 737 (Me. 1989).
64. The class consisted of the plaintiffs as well as "persons who travel by canoe, or
who will in the future travel by canoe on the Saco River, and who desire not to be
subjected to riverblock stops." Id. at 739.




69. Id. at 739.
70. Id. at 738.
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these searches violated the plaintiff class's constitutional rights."3
The plaintiffs did not seek damages to recover for the violation of
their rights, but rather sought to have the entire riverblock program
declared unconstitutional. 2 The superior court held the riverblocks
unconstitutional "as actually practiced in 1988.?" On appeal, the
State argued that the particular unconstitutional searches described
by the plaintiffs were irrelevant because they were mere aberrations
and could be easily corrected during future riverblocks, and that the
superior court did not rely on the specific unconstitutional searches
in reaching its decision.7
4
The Law Court disagreed on both points and affirmed the trial
court's ruling that the riverblocks were unconstitutional, but con-
fined its decision to the manner in which the riverblocks were con-
ducted in 1988. The court thus avoided the opportunity to declare
that riverblocks were unconstitutional per se; the court held only
that the riverblocks "as actually conducted in 1988" were unconsti-
tutional,7" which left the State free to try again in future summers
using more reasonable tactics.
7
1
Had the court instead taken the opportunity to perform a Brown
or Prouse-type balancing test, as it purported to do in its previous
roadblock cases, it should have found the riverblocks unconstitu-
tional, even if it ignored the manner in which the particular searches
before the court were carried out.7 7 The following is an analysis of
71. Id. at 739.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 740.
74. Id. at 739. The State argued that the superior court erroneously broadened its
ruling to cover the entire riverblock technique when it should have confined its hold.
ing to the facts of the specific, and admittedly unconstitutional, searches of the plain.
tiffs. The State was attempting to confine the reach of the superior court's ruling so
that riverblocks could be resumed in the future so long as they were conducted with-
out the constitutional defects of the searches at bar.
75. Id. at 740.
76. The Law Court explained that it was reviewing "the constitutionality of the
riverblock procedures as they were actually carried out in 1988, not as they might be
carried out in the absence of admittedly unconstitutional searches." ld at 739 (em-
phasis added).
77. Similarly, the undisputed facts indicate that the riverblocks should have
flunked the Deskins test, supra note 48 and accompanying text, since at least nine of
the factors would not have been satisfied:
- Since no written or oral procedures were followed, the olficers had com-
plete discretion while conducting the operation. (Factor 1.) See Sinclair v.
Vail, No. CV-88-302, slip op. at 10-11 (Me. Super. CL., Ken. Cty., Jan. 5.
1989) (findings of the trial court in Hatfield).
- The superior court found that the "timing and placement of the stop
was not at the prime time or location of the violations sought to be deterred
.... (Factors 2 and 3.) Id. at 19.
- There was no advance warning either to the public at large or to individ-
ual canoeists paddling down the river. (Factors 5 and 6.) Id. at 10.
- The riverblocks arguably created a high degree of fear and anxiety due
1992]
MAINE LAW REVIEW
the state's interest in conducting the riverblocks balanced against
the level of intrusion into Fourth Amendment rights presented by
the riverblocks to determine whether the riverblocks should have
passed constitutional muster had the court actually ruled squarely
on the issue.
1. State's Interest
Although the State of Maine has a legitimate interest in maintain-
ing a pleasant environment on the Saco River, the magnitude of that
interest is rather small compared to the other state interests that
have been held to justify suspicionless seizures. First, "raucousness"
is not even illegal unless it rises to the level of "disorderly con-
duct,17 8 which it probably did on many occasions on the Saco.
7 9
Nonetheless, for the portion of the raucous behavior that did
amount to disorderly conduct, the governmental interest in curbing
such behavior did not rise to the same level as the governmental
interest in deterring drunken or unlicensed drivers, spotting unsafe
vehicles, apprehending illegal aliens, or any of the other now-recog-
nized exceptions to the reasonable suspicion requirement of the
Fourth Amendment.
to the unexpected show of force, the coercive nature of the questioning, and
the presence of loose police dogs. (Factor 8.).
- Stops sometimes exceeded 20 minutes. (Factor 9.) Id. at 9. The road-
blocks previously approved by the court had all lasted less than two
minutes.
- Less intrusive methods were available. (Factor 11.) See supra note 56
and infra notes 81-82.
- The effectiveness of the procedure is debatable at best. (Factor 12.) See
infra note 81.
78. The relevant statute provides that a person is guilty of disorderly conduct
when, inter alia:
1. In a public place, he intentionally or recklessly causes annoyance to
others by intentionally:
A. Making loud and unreasonable noises;
B. Activating a device, or exposing a substance, which releases
noxious and offensive odors; or
C. Engaging in fighting, without being licensed or privileged to
do so;
2. In a public place or private place, he knowingly accosts, insults, taunts
or challenges any person with offensive, derisive or annoying words, or by
gestures or other physical conduct, which would in fact have a direct ten-
dency to cause a violent response by an ordinary person in the situation of
the person so accosted, insulted, taunted or challenged; . . .
ME. REV STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 501 (West 1983 and Supp. 1991-1992).
79. The trial court's findings of fact depicted a river environment which had de-
generated into a "big blast." Sinclair v. Vail, No. CV-88-302, slip op. at 3 (Me. Super.
Ct., Ken. Cty., Jan. 5, 1990). The court provided a vivid description of a once tranquil
area that had been overcome by "'Rambo' types and others who count their beer
consumption by the case rather than the can and raucously float down the river with
boorish disregard for the rights and pleasures of any but themselves." Id. at 2.
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Disorderly conduct is a Class E crime.80 The unruly canoeists, who
no doubt are an unsightly nuisance on an otherwise tranquil Maine
river, nevertheless do not generally threaten the lives or livelihoods
of others or themselves as do unsafe drivers, illegal aliens, and inter-
national drug traffickers. It is difficult to see much difference be-
tween the state's interest in stopping rowdy canoeists and its inter-
est in curbing crime generally."1 If it is reasonable under the Fourth
Amendment to employ suspicionless searches to combat minor Class
E crimes, it is difficult to conceive of objectives for which suspi-
cionless searches would be unreasonable.
In evading the question of the riverblock's overall constitutional-
ity, the Law Court also failed to consider whether the searches actu-
ally promoted the asserted public interest. Had the court under-
taken such an analysis, it would have been hard-pressed to find that
the riverblocks met that part of the Brown or Prouse tests. Raucous-
ness, by definition, is not a crime of concealment-as is drug traf-
ficking and drunken driving-assuming it is a crime at all. A crime
80. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 501(6) (West 1983).
81. If the police may constitutionally use checkpoints to deter a simple misde-
meanor such as disorderly conduct, it would appear that the erosion of the Fourth
Amendment in Maine is nearly complete. See, e.g., State v. Smith, 674 P.2d 562, 564
(Okla. Crim. App. 1984) ("iTlhe next logical step would be to allow similar stops for
searching out other types of criminal offenders," such as checkpoints outside of shop-
ping centers to curb shoplifting).
The conclusion that the State was using the riverblock to generally curb crime is
supported by the wide range of minor infractions detected by the three riverblock
operations. The authorities stopped a total of 4,777 canoes during the summer, out of
which the following violations were recorded:
Fishing without license 10
No flotation device 26
Unregistered craft I
Importation of beer 28
Possession of alcohol by a minor 4
Possession of marijuana 15
Drug paraphernalia 2
Fireworks I
Brief of Plaintiff-Appellees at 7 n.5, Hatfield v. Comm'r of Inland Fisheries, 566 A.2d
737 (Me. 1989). The range of offenses suggests that the riverblock was used as a gen-
eral "sweeping" operation rather than as a more surgical procedure narrowly tailored
to further a compelling state interest. Just under half of these violations (fishing
without a license, lack of flotation device, and unregistered craft) had nothing to do
with the State's stated reason for conducting the operation--control of rowdyism. Of
the remaining violations, importation of beer is predominant. This is an infraction for
which it would seem easy to develop some articulable suspicion without the necessity
of a riverblock. For example, an officer on the riverbank who observes canoeists pad-
dling downstream past the New Hampshire/Maine border while drinking beer from
large coolers could entertain a reasonable suspicion that a large quantity of the beer
had been purchased outside of Maine.
Interestingly, there were no citations for disorderly conduct, the elimination of
which was supposedly the goal of the riverblock operation.
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of concealment would tend to elevate the state's need for the use of
more intrusive methods because the existence of such a crime is
often not detectable by simply observing the person involved. Rau-
cous people are annoying precisely because they make a display of
themselves, depriving others of their expectation of peace and
quiet.
82
Furthermore, raucous behavior would presumably cease when the
unruly individuals glimpsed an approaching police checkpoint,
thereby providing the police with little opportunity to determine
which canoeists had been misbehaving. The behavior could easily
resume downstream of the checkpoint. One must ask, then, how
riverblocks could be considered a constitutionally reasonable means
of deterring raucous behavior when traditional means of law en-
forcement-such as observing a suspicious behavior and responding
appropriately-would seem far more effective in combating raucous
behavior and far less intrusive to the overwhelming majority of ca-
noeists who are just trying to enjoy a respite on a scenic Maine river.
2. Degree of Intrusion
Even if the State had conducted the Hatfield searches in a rea-
sonable manner (which the State admitted it had not), the river-
block operation might still tilt the intrusion side of the scale too far.
Arguably, one's expectation of privacy is theoretically higher while
recreating on a scenic river than it is while travelling on a public
highway. Furthermore, unlike motorists, canoeists encountering a
river checkpoint do not have the option of turning off and avoiding
the riverblock. Encountering large numbers of law enforcement of-
ficers on a river might be significantly more unsettling and frighten-
ing than encountering them on a highway, where they are more com-
monly found.
In sum, had the Law Court looked beyond the admitted unreason-
ableness of the particular searches which were in evidence below,
and instead considered the plaintiffs' claims that the entire river-
block program as practiced during the summer of 1988 was uncon-
stitutional, there would have been ample grounds to find the pro-
gram violative of the Fourth Amendment. The state interests
involved were simply far too small to justify the significant intru-
sions into the canoeists' Fourth Amendment rights. Nevertheless, by
focusing only on the admittedly unconstitutional searches, the Law
Court avoided making such a determination.
82. The warden responsible for the riverblock operations testified at trial that it is
"very easy to spot problem people on the Saco River." Brief of Plaintiff-Appellees at
41, Hatfield v. Comm'r of Inland Fisheries, 566 A.2d 737 (Me. 1989). Moreover, the
number of persons engaged in illegal activity was "'very small.'" Id. at 27. Given
these facts, it is hard to imagine how riverblocks could have promoted the State's
interest in any meaningful way.
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D. Enforcement of Fish and Game Regulations
In the next checkpoint case decided by the Law Court, State v.
Sherburne,s3 the defendants were convicted of possession of fish in
excess of the legal limit. The conviction was the result of a road-
block set up to detect violations of fishing laws.84 The Maine War-
den Service8 5 operated the roadblock in accordance with a written
policy on highway checkpoints and inspections, 6 and the operation
was approved in advance by a supervisory official. The checkpoint
was set up at a time and place where anglers returning from a week-
end expedition were likely to be encountered. Approaching motor-
ists were warned of the stop by a sign placed on the road. All vehi-
cles approaching the checkpoint were stopped and questioned about
fishing activity. Based on the nature of the responses and any obvi-
ous signs of fishing activity, the inquiring officer determined
whether further inquiry and inspection were called for. If so, the
vehicle was directed to a special inspection area, located just off the
highway, where a warden inspected the vehicle.
8 7
In determining that the roadblock did not violate the defendants'
Fourth Amendment rights, the court performed the usual balancing
test derived from Prouse and employed, with varying degrees of fi-
delity, in each of the court's prior roadblock cases.88 The court once
again recited the Deskins factors,' but again without specifically
applying them.
83. 571 A.2d 1181 (Me. 1990).
84. Id. at 1182.
85. The Warden Service is a bureau within the Department of Inland Fisheries
and Wildlife. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 7014 (West Supp. 1991-1992).
86. See Me. Dep't of Inland Fisheries & Wildlife, Policy 417 (1985) (reprinted in
State v. Sherburne, 571 A.2d at 1183 n.3).
87. State v. Sherburne, 571 A.2d at 1182-83.
88. The court assumed that the balancing test of Prouse extended to all suspi-
cionless seizures involving automobiles, including those related to fish and game vio-
lations. Yet this assumption is not necessarily shared by Fourth Amendment scholars:
It is certainly correct that the balance struck in Prouse does not inevita-
bly carry over to all other inspection procedures involving automobiles, and
thus it cannot be disputed that a different result is conceivable as to ran-
dom inspections by game wardens. It might be argued, for example, that
the alternative means for enforcing the hunting and fishing laws are less
effective than the alternative means noted in Prouse for dealing with high-
way safety. Yet, it is by no means immediately apparent that the detection
of game violations is a matter in which there exists such a strong public
interest . . . that the balance which the Fourth Amendment strikes as to
detection of crime generally is inappropriate.
4 WAYNE P LAFAVE. SEARCH & SEIZURE. § 10.8(e) (2d ed. 1987). See also Common-
wealth v. Palm, 462 A.2d 243 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1983) in which the court concluded that
a statute apparently allowing a game warden to stop and search a vehicle at any time
would not be consistent with the Fourth Amendment unless the stop was based on
reasonable suspicion and the search based on probable cause.




In assessing the state's interest in enforcing fish and game regula-
tions, the court cited the fact that conservation of natural resources
has been the subject of "pervasive legislation," and that this field is
one of "'great importance and value to the state.' "90 This "perva-
sive legislation" and "great importance" test represents the court's
lowest threshold to date in assessing the degree of state interest nec-
essary to uphold a roadblock as constitutional. A glance at the
Maine Revised Statutes would yield dozens of areas which have
been addressed by pervasive legislation and are of at least similar
importance to the state. Extending the court's rationale, in an effort
to deter theft (a matter presumably of "great importance") all mo-
torists leaving a commercial zone might be stopped. Those display-
ing obvious signs of shopping activity (shopping bags, etc.) might be
asked to produce receipts to prove that they paid for the
merchandise. 91
text for a list of these factors.
90. State v. Sherburne, 571 A.2d at 1184 (citation omitted). Justice Glassman, in
her dissent, criticized the majority for disposing of this "foundational premise . . . in
one perfunctory paragraph" (actually three sentences). Id. at 1188 (Glassman, J., dis-
senting). Justice Glassman contrasted this cursory analysis with the Supreme Court's
treatment of the extent of the governmental interest implicated in stemming the tide
of illegal aliens through the use of roadblocks in Martinez-Fuerte. In that case, the
Supreme Court "carefully analyzed the problem of implementing the long and well-
established national policy to limit immigration . . . and convincingly demonstrated
the urgency of the government's interest in adopting the least invasive means of im-
plementing this national policy." Id.
Curiously, though the court measured the importance of the governmental interest
by the volume of legislation on the subject, the court did not give much consideration
to the specifics of that legislation. A statute in force at the time of the Sherburne
roadblock allowed a warden to make a stop if he has "reason to believe" that a viola-
tion of the fish and game laws has occurred. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 7053(2)(D)
(West 1981) (emphasis added). The court had previously held that this language re-
quired the same measure of individualized suspicion as do Terry stops. State v. Hill-
ock, 384 A.2d 437, 440-41 (Me. 1978) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968)). Terry
approved a temporary investigative seizure when a police officer "observes unusual
conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude in light of his experience that crimi-
nal activity may be afoot ...." Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. at 30. In 1989, the Legisla-
ture changed the wording of section 7053 to require that the warden have "reasonable
and articulable suspicion" of a violation of the fish and game laws. P.L. 1989, ch. 170
(repealing ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 7053(2)(D). P.L. 1989, ch. 493, § 5 (adding
ME REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 7053(2)(D-1) (West Supp. 1991-1992)). Justice Glass-
man complained that these enactments alone should have been controlling, and criti-
cized the majority for its failure to account for them. State v. Sherburne, 571 A.2d at
1188-89 (Glassman, J., dissenting).
91. See, e.g., State v. Smith, 674 P.2d 562 (Okla. Crim. App. 1984):
[Ilt is well known to the public that shoplifting is an everyday occurrence
which constantly plagues merchants . . . .Are law enforcement authorities
then to be allowed to establish fixed checkpoints, permanent or otherwise,
outside of every shopping center in the area to question all exiting shoppers
as to whether they possess sales receipts? Are law enforcement authorities
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The Sherburne court also made only a cursory analysis of the
availability of less intrusive methods of enforcing fish and game
laws. The court simply noted the "difficult task" of enforcing such
laws in view of the limited number of personnel available and the
large and often remote areas that must be covered.9 2 Again, this low
threshold would justify suspicionless seizures for almost any purpose
inasmuch as Maine is a large rural state and, like most states, has
limited law enforcement resources.
Indeed, the Bill of Rights makes most law enforcement activities
significantly more difficult given the vast number of laws to be en-
forced, the ever larger number of criminals breaking those laws, and
the limited funds available to enforce the laws and apprehend the
criminals. If law enforcement "convenience" were a factor to be con-
sidered in balancing constitutional protections against promotion of
governmental interest, the Bill of Rights would most likely have
given way decades ago. The Supreme Court cautioned against the
Law Court's "convenience" approach in Almeida-Sanchez v. United
States:93 "The needs of law enforcement stand in constant tension
with the Constitution's protections of the individual against certain
exercises of official power. It is precisely the predictability of these
pressures that counsels a resolute loyalty to constitutional
safeguards."
2. Degree of Intrusion
Finally, the Sherburne court dealt with only one side of the
Prouse equation, again failing to fulfill its stated goal of "balancing
the intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests
to be allowed to demand all shoppers to produce such receipts or be subject
to arrest every time they go shopping? The potential for abuse is apparent.
Id. at 564-65.
92. State v. Sherburne, 571 A.2d at 1184-85.
93. 413 U.S. 266, 273 (1973) (holding that a suspicionless search by the Border
Patrol away from the border violated the Fourth Amendment). See also United
States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 575-76 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (emphasis
added):
Dispensing with reasonable suspicion as a prerequisite to stopping and in-
specting motorists because the inconvenience of such a requirement would
make it impossible to identify a given car as a possible carrier of aliens is no
more justifiable than dispensing with probable cause as a prerequisite to
the search of an individual because the inconvenience of such a require-
ment would make it impossible to identify a given person in a high-crime
area as a possible carrier of concealed weapons.
But see Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 110 S.CL at 2487 (emphasis added):
"[Flor purposes of Fourth Amendment analysis, the choice among ... reasonable
alternatives remains with the governmental officials who have a unique understanding
of, and a responsibility for, limited public resources, including a finite number of
police officers." Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion in Sitz is nevertheless based on
facts distinguishable from Sherburne since the Sitz roadblock was supported by a
much stronger state interest-combating drunken driving.
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against the promotion of legitimate governmental interests."9 4 Thus
the court considered the benefits of the roadblock without consider-
ing its potential costs.95
IV. MAINE ROADBLOCKS AFTER SITZ: STATE V. PATTERSON
It was not until June 1990 that the Supreme Court finally consid-
ered and approved, in Michigan Department of State Police v.
Sitz, 6 the use of drunk-driving roadblocks. The Law Court has de-
cided one roadblock case on the authority of Sitz-State v. Patter-
son 97-the facts of which differed from Sitz in the way night differs
from day. A comparison of Sitz with Patterson reveals the lengths
to which the Law Court is willing to go to uphold roadblocks.
1. State's Interest
The facts of Sitz were such that the result of the Supreme Court's
balancing process was easily supportable. The government's interest
in curbing the slaughter caused by drunken drivers is indisputable.
The objectives of the Patterson roadblock, however, were far less
urgent: to identify defects in vehicle safety equipment.98 The officer
in Patterson did not inspect licenses and registrations, but instead
checked headlights, plate lights, tires, and inspection and registra-
tion stickers.9 Again, it is difficult to equate the magnitude of the
government's interest in inspecting these items with such crucial
objectives as protecting the public from drunken drivers or curbing
the influx of illegal aliens.
The degree to which the seizure advances the public interest-the
second prong of the Brown test-would also seem rather low in Pat-
terson. Although this test does not require that the state 4how con-
clusively that the means chosen is the best of all possible choices,
the Law Court has the responsibility to examine "the availability of
less intrusive means to accomplish the objective and the efficacy of
the method chosen." 00 Yet the Patterson court failed to examine
any other means of satisfying the state's objective. Had the court
done so, it would have been difficult to avoid finding a variety of less
intrusive means. Headlights and plate lights can be checked far
94. State v. Sherburne, 571 A.2d at 1184 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
95. Compare id. with Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 110 S.Ct. at 2495
(Stevens, J., dissenting): "The Court's analysis of this issue resembles a business deci-
sion that measures profits by counting gross receipts and ignoring expenses,"
96. 110 S.Ct. 2481 (1990).
97. 582 A.2d 1204 (Me. 1990).
98. Id. at 1204.
99. Id. at 1206. Most of the safety items inspected by the police officer are read-
ily observable without bringing the automobile to a complete stop. Yet the officer in
Patterson did not check safety equipment that does require the vehicle to be brought
to a total stop, such as brakes, horn, seatbelts, etc.
100. Id. at 1205 (quoting State v. Sherburne, 571 A.2d at 1184).
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more efficiently by an officer at night by simply observing the pass-
ing traffic, and stopping any car with inadequate lights. There is no
need to first stop the cars or slow them down. An experienced officer
should also be able to catch expired stickers without the necessity of
bringing vehicles to a one and one-half to two-minute stop. In addi-
tion, Maine has a vehicle inspection system, requiring all vehicles to
be inspected annually.'0 1 This would appear to be a far more effi-
cient and effective means of insuring that vehicles are safe.
2. Degree of Intrusion
On the other side of the equation-the degree of intrusion into
Fourth Amendment rights-the Sitz facts were also conducive to
finding minimal intrusion. Written guidelines governing checkpoint
operations, site selection, and publicity were formulated by an advi-
sory committee made up of law enforcement officials, prosecutors,
and the University of Michigan Transportation Research Insti-
tute.'0 2 These guidelines served to drastically minimize any discre-
tion exercised by the individual officer. The guidelines permitted
roadblocks to be set up at selected sites. All of the vehicles entering
the Sitz checkpoint were stopped. Drivers showing no signs of intox-
ication were permitted to resume their trip without further delay.' 3
By contrast, the Patterson case exhibited none of these proce-
dural safeguards. The Patterson roadblock was the brainchild of a
single officer, who conducted it alone. The officer did not seek the
assistance or approval of anyone, relying on the fact that he had
conducted this kind of safety roadblock during the four years that
he had been on the force, and that he was aware that other state
police officers did the same thing in other parts of the state.' " This
kind of standardless and unconstrained officer discretion is difficult
to distinguish from that which the Supreme Court termed "evil" in
Prouse.'0 5
101. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 29, §§ 2503-2525 (West Supp. 1991-1992).
102. Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 110 S.Ct. at 2484.
103. Id.
104. State v. Patterson, 582 A.2d at 1206. The Law Court reasoned that the
"known procedure" for conducting these checks worked as a limit on the oflicer's
discretion. Id. This reasoning is in stark contrast with that of the Supreme Court in
Martinez-Fuerte and Sitz, where the officers were subject to written procedures.
When the procedures are not written or regularized, to determine the degree of dis.
cretion exercised by the field officer, reliance must be placed on the good faith of the
individual officer. This practice has been decried by the Supreme Court in another
well-known Fourth Amendment context: "[Slimple 'good faith on the part of the ar-
resting officer is not enough'. . . . If subjective good faith alone were the test, the
protections of the Fourth Amendment would evaporate, and people would be 'secure
in their persons, houses, papers and effects' only in the discretion of the police."
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 22 (1968) (quoting Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 97 (1964)).
105. Prouse held that a single stop made by a police officer without any suspicion
of wrongdoing-a stop made solely because the officer had nothing better to
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The Patterson roadblock was far more intrusive than the road-
block in Sitz with respect to the duration of the seizures. While the
duration of the stops which the Supreme Court found only mini-
mally intrusive in Sitz averaged just twenty-five seconds, the Pat-
terson safety checks lasted one and one-half to two minutes- six to
eight times longer. The officer in Patterson testified that he would
wave vehicles through if the line grew to seven or eight vehicles.100
This means that a car at the end of the line might have been de-
tained twelve to sixteen minutes, enough to make a motorist sub-
stantially late. Someone on his way to pick up a child at a day care
center, or to a business appointment or the like would probably find
even a five-minute delay highly intrusive.
Despite the obvious distinguishability of the Patterson facts from
Sitz-the relatively low government interest involved, the availabil-
ity of less intrusive but probably more effective alternatives, the
high degree of officer discretion involved, and the factors indicating
a much longer delay than in Sitz-the Law Court proclaimed: "We
cannot think of a less intrusive and more effective method of check-
ing for all of these violations at the same time.' 0 7 From this star-
tling conclusion, it appears not only that the court is unwilling to
consider the availability of less intrusive alternatives, but also that
the court is again giving significant weight to law enforcement "con-
venience" when assessing the intrusion on Fourth Amendment
rights. 08
do-violated the Fourth Amendment. The Court declared:
When there is not probable cause to believe that a driver is violating any
one of the multitude of applicable traffic and equipment regulations-or
other articulable basis amounting to reasonable suspicion that the driver is
unlicensed or his vehicle unregistered-we cannot conceive of any legiti-
mate basis upon which a patrolman could decide that stopping a particular
driver for a spot check would be more productive than stopping any other
driver. This kind of standardless and unconstrained discretion is the evil
the court has discerned when in previous cases it has insisted that the dis-
cretion of the official in the field be circumscribed, at least to some extent.
Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. at 661 (footnote omitted).
106. State v. Patterson, 582 A.2d at 1206.
107. Id (emphasis added).
108. See supra notes 92-93 and accompanying text. Furthermore, in requiring the
defendant to demonstrate that the roadblock was a "severe interference with the mo-
torist's liberty interest," the Patterson court seemed to have misread the Sitz stan-
dard for weighing the intrusiveness of the seizure. State v. Patterson, 582 A.2d at
1206 (emphasis added). The Brown test, implicitly adopted in Sitz, calls only for a
.'weighing of the severity of the interference" against the gravity of the public con-
cerns served by the seizure and the degree to which the seizure advances the public
interest; it does not say that the interference must be severe in order to be considered




An analysis of the Maine roadblock cases illustrates the Law
Court's willingness to permit significant slippage of the Fourth
Amendment's protections against unreasonable seizures. While pur-
porting to balance the state's interest in achieving its law-enforce-
ment objectives against the intrusion caused by the roadblock proce-
dure, the court has repeatedly engaged in analytical sleight of hand.
First, the court has been satisfied with the magnitude of the
state's interest as long as there was any state objective present. This
is evident when one compares the interests served by the Maine
roadblocks (to enforce fish limits, quiet rowdy canoeists, check vehi-
cle safety equipment, etc.) with the relative magnitude of the gov-
ernmental interests approved by the Supreme Court (detecting ille-
gal aliens, stemming drug trafficking, apprehending drunken or
unlicensed drivers, etc.). By repeatedly failing to carefully analyze
the magnitude of the state's interest in preventing the particular ac-
tivity at which the roadblock is aimed, the Law Court has consist-
ently misapplied the Supreme Court's balancing test.
In addition, the Law Court seems to be giving more weight to the
efficient and convenient enforcement of state laws than to intrusions
upon individual liberties caused by the roadblocks and riverblocks.
The danger of the Law Court's approach is that governmental
seizures may be considered reasonable under far more circumstances
as this kind of weighing of interests continues to be applied.
Second, the Law Court has consistently refused to consider the
availability of less intrusive means to accomplish the state's objec-
tives. This blind spot reflects the court's determination to stay out
of "policy-making" even at the expense of infringements upon the
constitutional protections guaranteed to Maine citizens. Yet decid-
ing whether suspicionless seizures are "reasonable" under the
Fourth Amendment necessarily involves examining the availability
and effectiveness of law enforcement alternatives which do not in-
fringe on constitutional rights. If such unintrusive alternatives are
both effective and available, that fact should cast significant doubt
on the "reasonableness" of a suspicionless seizure.
Third, although many of the roadblock stops sanctioned by the
court were seemingly brief and insubstantial, the court has ignored
the "big picture." The door which the court has opened by permit-
ting suspicionless seizures will be almost impossible to close in the
future and far easier to open further.
It is hoped that the Law Court will avail itself of its next opportu-
nity to reexamine this issue. In future cases, the court should vigor-
ously apply the three-prong Brown test and take a more assertive
stance in its role as a guardian of Fourth Amendment rights by in-
sisting that only grave and extraordinary evils be combated through
the use of suspicionless seizures. The court should further require
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that the use of the roadblock be justified by the ineffectiveness of
any alternative methods that are less intrusive. In addition, the
court should more closely consider the frequently cited (but never
applied) Deskins factors in determining the reasonableness of a
roadblock. In so doing, the court should insist on higher standards
for the actual conduct of the roadblocks-standards which serve to
minimize the unconstrained discretion of individual officers as well
as the fear, shock, and annoyance that roadblocks (and riverblocks)
can cause.
Finally, the court would do well to recall the words of Justice
Jackson, written shortly after his return from the Nuremberg trials:
These [Fourth Amendment rights] . . . are not mere second-class
rights but belong in the catalog of indispensable freedoms. Among
deprivations of rights, none is so effective in cowing a population,
crushing the spirit of the individual and putting terror in every
heart. Uncontrolled search and seizure is one of the first and most
effective weapons in the arsenal of every arbitrary government. 10e
Jonathan A. Block
109. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 180 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
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